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Foreword 
 
Water quality trading or water emissions trading provide an important instrument for 
improving the state of inland waters and sea water. For Europe, the trading of nutrient 
loads is especially important. Research suggests that trading is extremely well suited 
to healing the most polluted sea in the world, the Baltic Sea. This observation applies 
to the North Sea as well, suggesting that this instrument could play a significant role 
in improving the state of the big European rivers such as the Rhine and the Danube. 
When Europe takes a serious initiative to improve the quality of water in these cross-
national rivers, trading programs in nutrients designed to river basins provide a 
feasible solution to use. 
 
Trading in nutrients has two good properties: the outcome of trading is cost-efficient, 
and we know for certain that trading implements the wanted reduction in nutrient 
loads. For point sources, trading in nutrient works in a similar fashion as for climate 
emissions; nonpoint sources provide a challenge, but it can be handled, as 
experience in the US shows. I have demonstrated that by trading in nutrients 
between waste water treatment plants, the littoral countries of the Baltic Sea can 
achieve surprisingly cheaply 70% of the phosphorus target and 63% of the nitrogen 
target of the Baltic Sea Action Plan. 
 
Unlike Europe, the United States has much experience in many types of water quality 
trading programs, including programs designed for nutrients. Europe needs to study 
the experience from existing programs. Furthermore, much new research is needed 
to explore fully the potential that water quality trading programs can provide to 
European waters. 
 
The publication at hand by Michiel Wind is strategically very important. It provides the 
long needed information on the features of water quality trading for practitioners and 
policy makers. Wind covers not only the background of trading programs but also 
provides a useful account of studies and suggestions made for policy makers, among 
others, the detailed proposal by the Nordic Environment Finance Cooperation 
(NEFCO) on organizing a voluntary trading program for the Baltic Sea.  
 
I hope this report will reach a wide audience. 
 
 
Markku Ollikainen 
 
Professor of Environmental and Resource Economics 
Department of Economics and Management 
University of Helsinki 
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Summary 
 
In several European countries there is an interest in WET, as illustrated by around 14 
studies summarized in this report. 
 
Main conclusion is that present EU directives limit room for WET, and that EC-
guidance and leadership, legal accommodation, and support is necessary in order to 
harvest the benefits of WET: mainly cost savings and earlier achievement of better 
water quality. But even today WET should be possible in Europe. The Swedish and 
Baltic Sea plans show this, and have developed a clever way to deal with potential 
problems of including non-point sources. 
 
Many studies mention (perceived) juridical conflicts with (but also support in) present 
EU directives, mainly IPPC, Nitrates Directive and WFD. Mainly the Belgian, some of 
the Dutch and the Scandinavian studies discuss these conflicts in detail. Conclusion 
is that even with present legislation WET is possible, though present legislation limits 
the number of discharge permits that an emitter can buy and use. These limits may 
prevent achieving to the full all benefits of WET, but they may also help preventing 
one of the main potential problems with WET: hot spots in emissions due to emitters 
using too many permits locally. 
 
Some suggestions are given for possible watersheds where WET might be used, and 
some other pollutants than eutrophication that is most commonly tackled with WET.  
 
Finally, specific recommendations are given: 
 
The EC: 
 Provide facilitation with financial support and guidance, similar to EPA’s water 
trading policy of 2003 (US EPA, 2003); 
 Use legal room already available for pilots; 
 Study opportunities for WET applied to new environmental problems and areas; 
 Commission research into WET in Europe. 
 
National member state governments: 
 Lobby the EC for WET-facilitation; 
 Use legal room already available: phases 1 and 2 of the Baltic Sea trading plan 
can be implemented today in any European country or water body: reversed 
auction and an investment fund financed by point source dischargers, both 
voluntary; 
 Study opportunities for WET applied to new environmental problems and in 
specific catchment areas (river basins); 
 Explore using existing institutions for implementing WET, for example the Dutch 
emission trading authority (‘Nederlandse Emissiehandelsautoriteit’, NEa) or 
similar in other countries, or other suitable water authorities, such as water 
boards. 
 
Other authorities such as water boards and municipalities: 
 Use legal room already available for pilots and experiments; 
Propose detailed plans to the EC and ask for support and facilitation.
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Introduction 
This report is about Water Emissions Trading (WET or Water Quality Trading) in 
Europe. The goal is to inform about the basic principles, provide an overview of 
studies done in Europe, and suggest some future opportunities for WET in Europe. 
 
The principle of cap and trade emissions trading is simple: authorities place a cap on 
the use of a scarce resource, allocate the rights to the resource (also called permits, 
credits or allowances) to users, and thereafter free trade keeps the rights allocated in 
an optimal way. Practice is more complex than this, but the principle has been shown 
to work. The EU-ETS for greenhouse gases is a well-known and successful 
application of emissions trading, but little is known in Europe about application to 
water quality. Yet, there is ample experience with WET, amongst others in the USA, 
New Zealand, and Australia.  
 
In Europe, there has only been limited interest in this market based policy instrument. 
The EU are funding research into economic instruments for water management 
through the 7th Framework Programme, but trading is ignored in this research 
project. While on the EU-level WET is still overlooked, on a member state level there 
has been a number of studies. There are detailed proposals for Sweden and for the 
Baltic Sea. Furthermore, there are several studies on water emissions trading in 
several European member states.  
 
These studies and proposals are discussed in this report, and conclusions and 
recommendations from them are summarized.  
 
I need to thank for their indispensable support and valuable comments: 
- Bob Pengel (independent consultant water management, flood management and 
ICT/GIS),  
- Linda Karlsson (environmental economist in Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency), 
- Markku Ollikainen (Professor Environmental and Resource Economics, University 
of Helsinki),  
- Reinder Torenbeek (freelance consultant in the field of water quality and aquatic 
ecology), 
- Sean Blacklocke (consultant on economic, policy and scientific matters related to 
water resources). 
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1. What is Water Emissions Trading - general principles 
The aim of many environmental policy instruments is to limit polluting emissions to an 
acceptable or sustainable level. The only instrument that does just this while 
otherwise leaving actors free and minimizes overall costs is emissions trading 
according to the principle of cap and trade. Changes in market conditions will not 
affect the result for the environment, as opposed to environmental levies. Emissions 
trading has been applied to a wide variety of environmental problems. The European 
Emission Trading Scheme for greenhouse gases is the most well-known emissions 
trading system, and is generally considered a success. Less well-known, at least in 
Europe, is the use of emissions trading for control of water pollution. 
 
How does it work? Within a watershed the total allowable discharge is defined, taking 
into account the (ecological) water quality goals. All dischargers receive tradable 
permits, giving them the right to discharge a fixed quantity of pollution. They can then 
buy or sell permits from one another as they like, as long as overall water quality 
objectives will still be met.  
 
Dischargers’ decisions to trade will depend on what is attractive and cheaper for 
them: paying for their own emission reduction measures, or buying permits from 
others. Sellers can use part of the money to reduce their own emissions more cost 
effectively, and keep the rest as a profit. In this way reduction measures will 
collectively be undertaken with improved overall cost-effectiveness, which in turn will 
speed up the process of achieving water quality objectives.  
 
If necessary, the total allowable discharge (emission cap) can gradually be lowered 
over the years in order to raise water quality. With a relatively high initial cap, the 
initial economic impact will be lower and hence acceptance of such measures higher. 
Furthermore, overall societal cost may be lower because there is more time for actors 
to implement and develop (innovative) measures and fit them into regular investment 
cycles. Therefore too, this gradual lowering of the cap would preferably have to be 
announced to the market long time in advance. 
 
On the other hand, if trading partners anticipate that the improved cost effectiveness 
in their collective clean-up is going to be used as a justification for government 
lowering the cap (raise the water quality standard), they may not use this instrument 
– they may continue lobbying and litigating against higher standards.  
 
A way around this is to let environmental NGOs and other water users like angling 
clubs in on the market. Then they can buy permits and retire them to improve water 
quality standards beyond the cap. Also, as these NGO’s are expected to have a high 
willingness to pay for clean water, they may contribute to reaching the socially 
optimal level of water quality. 
 
Advantages of WET: 
1. It is compliant with the ‘polluter pays principle’ (Article 9, Water Framework 
Directive, WFD), 
2. More cost-effective sets of measures can be taken, alleviating problems of 
disproportional costs. Quantifying and addressing the magnitude (cost 
effectiveness) and distribution (cost disproportionality) of compliance costs are 
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explicit requirements of the WFD (Articles 3-b, 4-a-ii, 5, 5-a, 7-d, 16-6). 
3. It stimulates innovation towards more cost effective water pollution control 
technology, because innovators can earn money on selling their innovations and 
emission permits generated. 
4. Discharge targets are reached in less time and at lower costs. 
5. Trading systems are cost-effective irrespective of the initial allocation, so that it 
can be used to cope with equity issues. For example, most cost-effective 
measures may be found in the agricultural sector, but still agriculture may not be 
able to bear the costs of taking these measures. If agriculture is allocated 
relatively generously with permits, the sector can sell the permits to other sectors, 
and pay for the cheap reduction measures in agriculture. 
6. Letting NGO’s in on the market will elicit true willingness to pay (WTP), as 
opposed to the contingent valuation method, which uses hypothetical markets to 
assess WTP. Also it may help reaching better water quality faster. 
 
1.1 Different types of WET 
In practice, WET will only rarely be a pure cap and trade system as described in 
textbooks. In the book 'Water-Quality Trading’, by Jones, Bacon, Kieser and Sheridan 
(2006, WERF) four types of WET are distinguished. These categories are similar to 
the WRI-classification (Selman, 2009). See Table 1.  
 
WERF WRI Example Pros Cons 
Centrally 
managed 
trading 
clearinghouse Long Island 
Sound 
resembles 
traditional 
regulation and 
a discharge 
levy 
less local 
freedom, less 
market 
allocation, less 
cost-effective, 
bureaucratic 
Trading 
associations 
bilateral trades Tar-Pamlico 
Trading 
Association 
(founded 
1989) 
legally simple 
(if pilot-project 
status granted) 
limited cost-
saving trades 
in the market? 
Market-like 
trading 
exchange 
market 
Lower Boise 
River 
lowest costs, 
liquid market 
technically and 
legally 
complicated? 
Small-scale 
offset 
programs 
sole-source 
offsets 
Rahr Malting 
Company 
small-scale, 
simple 
no liquid 
market, risk of 
market power 
Table 1 Overview of four categories of water emissions trading systems from the WERF-book 'Water-
Quality Trading’, by Jones, Bacon, Kieser and Sheridan (2006) and the WRI-classification (Selman, 2009). 
The pros and cons are M. Wind’s judgment. 
Another distinction in types of WET is between international and domestic trading 
programs: the former require more (legal) coordination and agreement between 
nations. The Chesapeake Bay trading program suffers from the lack of coordination 
between the participating states (personal communication professor Markku 
Ollikainen, e-mail from July 18, 2011). A good reference on this matter is Baumol and 
Oates, 1988. 
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1.2 Trading under an absolute cap versus trading relative to a 
baseline 
In general, the cap and trade type of WET is difficult to apply to diffuse or non-point 
sources, such as agriculture, run-off and long-term leaching from water bottoms and 
groundwater. These sources are difficult to measure and model, and responsible 
actors and polluters may be hard to identify and hold accountable. Therefore, in the 
case of non-point sources, we may have to resort to rules of thumb, best available 
technologies, and so-called baseline and credit-based trading (also called 
performance standards based trading).  
 
Credit-based trading means that a baseline needs to be set by authorities. In 
practice, this means that if you operate according to a defined generally accepted 
manner, you need not buy credits. If you operate in a worse manner, you need to buy 
credits. On the other hand, by taking certain additional measures (often called Best 
Management Practices, BMP’s), credits are generated. These credits can be sold to 
other polluters emitting more than the set baseline because they did not take the 
required minimum, baseline measures.  
 
In some literature, in the case of cap and trade, the tradable units are described as 
allowances, while in the case of credit-based trading, one speaks of credits. In the 
case of cap and trade, total emissions are known and can be allocated to responsible 
entities. In the case of credit-based trading, total emissions are not known, but only 
changes in emissions relative to the set baseline are known.  
 
Cap and trade is seen as the theoretically best type of trading, because than for all 
emissions permits are required, and hence (opportunity) costs are born by the 
emitter. This holds true, even if permits are grandfathered (for free), because when 
using permits, revenues from selling them are forgone. In baseline and credit-based 
trading however, emissions up to the baseline are free of costs to the emitter, but not 
to society: a market failure. This means there are external costs leading to sub-
optimal decisions by the polluter. Another way to put it: a new nonpoint source gets to 
emit up to the baseline for free, and a nonpoint source contemplating to stop its 
activity altogether is not stimulated to do so by revenues from selling its no longer 
needed permits. 
 
More on the theory of emissions trading, see Tietenberg (2006). For the differences 
between trading under an absolute cap versus trading relative to a baseline, see 
Nentjes and Woerdman (2012). 
 
1.3 Trading ratio’s 
Emissions of pollutants do not always harm the environment equally: damage may 
vary with location and time. In most water quality trading systems, the problem of 
differences in environmental impact due to location (or time) is solved by applying 
‘trading ratios’: in order to be allowed to emit one unit over here, one has to reduce a 
different number of units over there (Hung and Shaw, 2005). 
 
Furthermore, a trading ratio different from 1:1 may be applied in order to account for 
risk and uncertainty, to make sure water quality does not suffer from a trade but 
rather improves. Especially at non-point sources (mainly agriculture, but also urban 
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runoff), it may be uncertain if and when a measure results in an emission reduction or 
water quality improvement, and monitoring is difficult.1 
 
According to Professor Markku Ollikainen (personal communication, e-mail July 18, 
2011), we can distinguish between two trading systems: emissions trading and 
ambient trading systems. The former is for uniformly mixed emissions (such as GHG 
gases) while the latter is for regional, only non-uniformly emissions (water pollutants, 
SO2, NOx). In the former, permits are traded in a 1:1 ratio, but in the latter in the ratio 
the polluters load to the chosen receptor points. (Note, e.g. the US Acid Rain 
program is for non-uniformly mixed pollutants, but applied on a 1:1 basis, because 
this is easier for trading.) In both cases, the trading system can be created using 
either the cap-and-trade principle or the baseline and credit system.
                                            
1
 Another way of dealing with this risk is to bank the credit generated (keep it in store), and wait to 
observe the positive result of the cleanup measure, before the credit takes on value and can be sold. 
This may be referred to as ‘mitigation banking’. 
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2. Water quality trading in the US and elsewhere 
Mainly in the USA (and in Australia and New Zealand, and expected to increase in 
Canada and China (Stanton, 2010), there is ample experience and research available 
on Water Quality Trading or Water Emissions Trading (WET). In Europe however, 
there is hardly any experience. This is quite surprising, as conditions and problems in 
European water management sector have many similarities to those in the USA. 
 
In the USA, WET has been used primarily for eutrophication problems (emissions of 
phosphorus and nitrogen), but also for discharges of cooling water, toxic substances 
and salts. A useful and short overview can be found in World Resources Institute 
(WRI, 2009). The WRI inventory identified 57 water quality trading programs 
worldwide. Of these, 27 are active, 21 are under consideration or development, and 
10 are inactive or are completed pilots. All but six trading programs are located in the 
USA: four in Australia, one in New Zealand and one in Canada.  
 
Furthermore, the WRI identified five key factors that stakeholders and experts should 
note as important for the successful implementation of trading programs: 
1. Strict regulation, a cap or other drivers that create a demand for credits. 
2. Small liability risks: when you buy or sell a credit, you should feel secure that the 
authorities support and acknowledge the trade legally. 
3. Robust, consistent and standardized methods to determine emission quantities. 
4. Standardized tools, transparent processes, and online registries to minimize 
transaction costs, and make trading easy (such as www.nutrientnet.org). 
5. Early stakeholder involvement and support, and a participatory process for 
developing and implementing a trading program. 
 
Apart from this WRI overview, the book Water-Quality Trading by Jones et al. (2006) 
is recommendable. Furthermore, there are numerous papers and other publications 
available on theory and the US experience with water quality trading. 
 
Another interesting overview is in Stanton, 2010, p. 51 – 69, chapter reviewed by US 
WQT expert Mark Kieser. Citation:  
 
Many projects may also generate co-benefits such as biodiversity conservation, air 
quality improvements, job creation, and even building community. Such benefits are 
not always captured in the price per pound calculation. For example, stakeholders 
noted that one of the greatest benefits of the Alpine Cheese Company/Sugar Creek 
Trading Program in Ohio is that it brought all sides to the table to negotiate a solution 
to the falling water quality in the sub watershed. Regardless of the long-term viability 
of the trading scheme, there has been significant improvement in the tenor of the 
conversation about water quality in the sub-watershed among the parties. A similar 
“benefit” to developing a trading program was cited by PWS (Payments for 
Watershed Services, MW) project developers in China and Africa as the 
“intangibles”—non-quantifiable benefits to pursuing trading as a tool to address 
water quality. 
 
When US experience with WET is discussed in Europe, often skeptics point at low 
trading activity in existing US trading programs. Stanton (2010) writes (citation): 
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Program inactivity occurs for several reasons and does not necessarily signify a 
failure to meet environmental, policy, or market objectives. Key reasons for inactive 
programs include: meeting permit requirements, lack of adequate regulatory drivers, 
and insufficient economies of scale. 
 
While the achievement of water quality requirements explains the lack of transaction 
activity in a few cases, the overwhelming influence on inactive programs comes from 
insufficient demand because of nonexistent or not sufficient regulation. Several 
programs were developed in anticipation of regulatory drivers that are not yet in 
place. For example, trading in the Virginia Nutrient Trading Program was created 
with the expectation of more stringent guidelines and is entirely contingent on the 
implementation of a TMDL for nitrogen and phosphorus. While the program has yet 
to experience any monetary transactions, its trading platform has issued binding 
agreements to 105 facilities, committing US$3.1 million for nitrogen and phosphorus 
reductions. 
 
It’s worth noting that in most cases and for most permitted facilities, the standards 
were met easily and relatively cheaply suggesting that compliance in the future will 
become more costly as water quality standards become more stringent. As this 
happens, the demand for nutrient credits may increase and the overall attractiveness 
of nutrient trading tools will also increase. This development will bode well for 
the regions that have invested in the development of trading policies, tools, and 
platforms in anticipation of this eventual demand. 
 
The benefits of water quality trading may increase sharply as more restrictive 
wastewater discharge permit limits are adopted. In addition, nitrogen discharges to 
surface waters from coal-fired power plants could increase as new air emission 
controls are installed; some of which use nitrogen-based reagents to capture 
pollutants in flue gas. Purchasing offset credits is likely to be less expensive than 
investment in on-site treatment facilities, particularly since an ample supply of low-
cost credits from agriculture appears achievable. Eventually, the EPRI-led project is 
expected to serve as a model for developing other interstate water quality trading 
initiatives. In addition, reduced surface water nitrogen and phosphorous discharges 
into the Ohio River Basin may help reduce nutrient loading in downstream 
waterways as far away as the Gulf of Mexico. 
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3. Status in Europe 
  
In Europe there has only been a limited number of studies into WET: a handful of 
studies in the Netherlands, a Ph.D. study in Germany, a study into legal possibilities 
in Flanders/Belgium, and a study in Italy. The most interesting and elaborate studies 
however have been done for Sweden and for the Baltic Sea. All of these studies 
(apart from the Italian one), are discussed briefly underneath. 
 
In a report from the IUCN (Greiber, 2009) on the economic value of groundwater and 
biodiversity in European forests 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/pdf/grounwater_report.pdf) it reads (p.11): 
“Water quality trading has developed in the US, providing an innovative approach to 
meeting requirements under the Clean Water Act, and is an approach that has been 
largely overlooked in Europe so far.”. 
 
3.1 Swedish Model 
Based on publications and proposals by Professor Dennis Collentine (Collentine, 
2006 and 2007), the Swedish EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) has elaborated 
a 'fee-system with trading possibilities' for nitrogen and phosphorus. In short, this 
system functions as follows: 
- Regulated point sources are allocated a discharge cap (‘legal regulation’), and for 
emissions over that cap, they pay a fee.  
- Regulating authorities use that fee to pay for compensating reduction measures in 
other, non-regulated sources, such as agriculture (‘Centrally managed trading’ or 
‘Clearing-house’ -system). 
- These compensating measures (‘contracts’) are chosen by means of a reverse 
auction: actors are invited to offer reduction measures, and the authorities chose 
the measures with best cost-effectiveness.  
- Finally, in the so-called secondary permit market, regulated point sources can 
trade permits amongst themselves. 
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Figure 1. The Swedish model. Source: Swedish EPA, 2009 
 
Although some people see the Swedish system as a variant of reversed auction, it 
fits well under the WET category of ‘Centrally Managed Trading’, as described in 
Water-Quality Trading (Jones, 2005, p 14.), or the ‘Clearing House’- type of the WRI, 
2009, p. 11 (see 1.1 Different types of WET). The level of the fee is determined by 
authorities, based on the costs of the most expensive compensating measure 
necessary to precisely compensate all surplus emissions of the regulated point 
sources. Furthermore, permit trading in the secondary market is of course true 
'Market-like Trading' in the same categorization in WERF, 2007 (or ‘Exchange Market’ 
in WRI, 2009, p. 11). The system is called a ‘fee system with trading possibilities’ by 
the Swedes, but the level of the fee is based on market forces, so this is rather a 
permit trading system than a fee system. 
 
The system is a combination of a ‘cap and trade’ and a ‘baseline and credit’ system: 
the regulated point sources are allocated an absolute cap (‘cap and trade’), but the 
non-regulated sources can create credits by reducing their emissions beyond a set 
baseline (a sort of 'business as usual'). The regulated sources are mainly wastewater 
treatment plants and forest operations (paper and saw mills), while non-regulated 
sources are mainly agriculture and smaller wastewater treatment plants. The 
regulating authority may be the regional government or water board. 
 
By this combination of two trading systems, the best of both worlds is achieved: the 
regulating authority acts as a broker or bank, and trading partners avoid the risk of 
failing compensating measures. Furthermore, the traded commodity is made uniform 
and homogeneous: trading partners do not have to worry about trading ratios and 
uncertainty. The regulating authority makes it easy for all pollution sources to take 
part in the system: 
- regulated sources simply pay the fee or buy permits from other regulated sources 
if they emit more than their allocated cap, and 
- non-regulated sources get paid for reduction measures by the authority as if it 
were a regular state subsidy. 
- All sources are stimulated to look for innovative clean technologies because they 
14 
 
can earn money by selling generated permits or reductions credits. 
 
Regulated sources can choose between paying the fee, and buying credits from 
other regulated sources, so fee and credit prices will tend to be equal. Furthermore, 
the price that the authority pays for compensating measures, will equal the fee they 
charge to regulated sources. 
 
In order to account for retention of nutrients and other causes of differences in 
environmental damage, a zone system is used to determine the level of the fee. In 
most water quality trading systems, the problem of differences in environmental 
impact due to the location is solved by applying trading ratios: in order to be allowed 
to emit one unit over here, one has to reduce a different number of units over there. 
But in the Swedish system, one unit of emissions in a place with high environmental 
impact simply pays a higher fee. 
 
Research has shown (p. 123, Swedish EPA, 2010) that if measures with best cost-
effectiveness would have been chosen in Swedish past reduction efforts, a 50% cost-
reduction would have been possible. A fee-trading system would be able to elect the 
most cost-effective measures. Much of the administrative and enforcement costs 
would remain the same as with traditional regulation, though monitoring, setting up 
the system and (other) transaction costs may require extra resources (p.130 -131, 
Swedish EPA, 2010). 
 
The Swedish model uses the experience from (mainly US) water quality trading 
programs. Many of these existing trading programs suffer from low trading activity 
(though they still may be profitable!). This is attributed partly to high transaction costs 
in the form of liability risks of failure, and bureaucracy. Another cause of low trading 
activity in the US is lack of (sufficiently low) caps on total emissions, resulting in little 
need for trading. This is may change in the future. 
 
The Swedish fee system is designed to in due time be integrated in a possible 
trading system for the whole of the Baltic Sea (see Chapter 3.2). 
 
The proposals by the Swedish EPA have been well met by the Swedish government. 
However, Swedish EPA has concluded that in the long run the fee system cannot be 
combined with present national and EU regulation. Government has now asked the 
EPA to investigate introduction of the fee-trading system for only point-sources, which 
may be a first step to introducing a larger scale system. 
 
Furthermore, the Swedish EPA hopes that other EU member states support and 
adopt the concept of WET, in order to speed up the process of accommodating the 
European legal framework to WET. 
 
3.2 The Helcom proposal for the Baltic Sea 
This thorough study of some 100 pages (Green Stream Network, 2008) describes a 
‘Framework for a Nutrient Quota and Credits Trading System for the Contracting 
Parties of Helcom in Order to Reduce Eutrophication of the Baltic Sea’. Helcom is an 
acronym for Helsinki Convention, which adopted the Baltic Sea Action Plan to clean 
up the Baltic Sea. The Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (Nefco) financed the 
study. It is expected that current legislation and measures will not be sufficient to 
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reach the target of a clean and healthy Baltic Sea, especially regarding 
eutrophication. Furthermore, there are large differences in agricultural practices and 
other measures already taken, resulting in large differences in cost-effectiveness. 
Therefore trading could be beneficial: three studies cited in the report, indicate cost 
reductions of about 50%, or 3 to 10 billion euro per year. 
 
However, there are a number of challenges to introducing trading. Firstly, there are 
no annual monitoring data available for point or for non-point sources. Secondly, 
there are legal barriers. On the other hand, there are also legal elements that support 
the use of flexible policy instruments such as nutrient trading. The report says in the 
Summary for Policymakers:  
'It is clear from the international, EU and national legal frameworks that there is 
strong support for the continued development of flexible policy tools to address the 
issue of eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. The authors suggest that complex and 
overlapping sources of law do not inherently prohibit the implementation of nutrient 
trading, and particularly in relation to Best Environmental Practices, for non-point 
sources, there is a legal niche for nutrient trading.'  
 
Respecting this background, the report describes a plan to gradually introduce a 
trading system in four phases. Over time, and with the experience of the earlier 
phases, the two challenges mentioned can be met. The report proposes to base the 
first two phases on voluntary trading, while the last two phases would be non- 
voluntary with respect to being integrated into the trading system. The first two 
phases would entail ‘baseline and credit trading’ (credits related to certain activities, 
see 1.2 Trading under an absolute cap versus trading relative to a baseline). The 
baseline would be current Emission Limit Values (ELV's) and Best Available 
Technologies (BAT's). In phase 3 and 4, when monitoring and reporting procedures 
are harmonized, more sources can be transferred to a cap-and-trade scheme linked 
to the initial baseline-and-credit scheme. 
 
Key features of this plan include: 
- As the plan addresses eutrophication, both nitrogen and phosphorus can be 
traded interchangeably across the whole of the Baltic Sea. The unit trade is 
'equivalent kilogram of nitrogen'. The ratio between N (Nitrogen) and P 
(Phosphorus) is fixed by the Redfield ratio: 1 kg of N equals 0.14 kg of P. 
- In order to prevent new hot spots due to regional sources buying too many credits 
from other regions, no source is allowed to increase its discharges above existing 
permitted levels. New sources and existing sources increasing their capacities, 
are allowed to emit only normally permitted quantities (according to present 
regulation). 
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Figure 2. The coverage of the scheme increases gradually. Phases 1 and 2 are based on voluntary 
demand whereas Phases 3 and 4 are based on compliance demand. (Source: Green Stream Network, 
2008). 
 
The four phases are explained in more detail in Table 2 underneath. Note that even if 
not all phases are executed, efforts to improve monitoring and other preparations for 
later phases will be useful in making alternative eutrophication policy plans. 
Furthermore, also the early phases alone will improve cost-effectiveness and save 
money. 
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Table 2. Details of the four phases (source: Green Stream Network, 2008)  
 
Although various words and expressions are used, many elements of this plan are 
similar to the Swedish concept and plans considered in other countries. For example, 
the investment fund which is filled with money from amongst others levies on point 
18 
 
sources not participating in the scheme, is also found in the Swedish plan and in the 
Dutch concept of a 'compensation fund' (KPMG, 2008). In Ireland WET has been 
considered for the catchment of Lough Melvin, but ‘reverse auction’ was chosen to 
elaborate2. 
 
The trading potential for the whole of the Baltic Sea drainage area is estimated to 1.1 
billion kg of nitrogen equivalents, the current anthropogenic waterborne load to the 
Baltic Sea. Of this load, 49% originates from agriculture and forestry, and 35% from 
municipal wastewater treatment plants or the lack of them. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations: 
- Nutrient trading may provide a cost-effective way to combat eutrophication. 
- Because accurate monitoring and understanding of the system by the polluters is 
required, a gradual introduction of the system is recommended. 
A SWOT analysis of the proposed system is given in the report, and is shown 
underneath in Table 3. 
 
In a study by Hautakangas and Ollikainen (2011) it is demonstrated how trading can 
help the BSAP work out more equitable and cheap, and therefore faster. As the 
BSAP is now, major part of the reduction effort and costs come down on Poland and 
other former East-bloc countries, while benefits of a cleaner sea come to all littoral 
countries. When permits are allocated relatively generously to big emitters with cheap 
measures (such as Poland), they can sell these to finance their huge reduction 
efforts.  
 
In general: any sector or group of emitters unable to pay for their cheap and needed 
reductions can be allocated relatively many permits. This does not respect the 
polluter pays principle on a group level, but it does so on an individual level. 
                                            
2
 In a reverse auction, the sellers instead of the byers compete to obtain business from the buyer. 
Prices will typically decrease as the sellers undercut each other. Personal communication, e-mail Dr 
Claire Cockerill, Environmental Economics, Gibson Institute for Land, Food and Environment, Queens 
University Belfast, January 11, 2008. 
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Table 3 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis of the Baltic Sea trading plan. 
 
3.3 Finland: Trading simulation for Finnish river 
In this article (Lankoski et al. 2008) a simulation is made of effluent trading between 
point and nonpoint sources in a river basin in Finland, Kymi River Valley, to improve 
water quality in the Gulf of Finland.  
 
Measures for nonpoint sources to reduce effluents (nitrogen and phosphorus) are to 
establish buffer strips to stop runoff from fields, and change to crops requiring less 
nitrogen fertilization. Reducing the quantity of fertilizer is in itself not a valid measure 
to generate credits because it is hard to enforce (‘moral hazard’). Point sources are 
waste water treatment plants, which have technological abatement possibilities. 
Trading is made according to the ratio reflecting the transportation of nutrients to the 
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Gulf of Finland from each location. Aims are to find whether the chosen measures in 
agriculture can provide considerable reductions in nutrient loads, and what are the 
incentives of farmers to participate in the trading program.  
 
Reduction potential in agriculture is found great and farmers are the greatest 
suppliers of credits, but their gains from trading vary substantially. Some farmers may 
become net buyers of permits and thus net losers from regulation. The benefits of 
effluent trading are distributed unevenly among point sources as well. A generous 
initial allocation may be needed to strengthen the incentives of farmers to participate 
in the program and gain support for the trading program. 
 
3.4 Belgium: legal possibilities for WET in Europe 
In Dutch, an exploratory study into the legal possibilities and design issues of 
tradable discharge rights or reductions for dischargers, as an innovative policy 
instrument in the Flemish County (Peter de Smedt, 2007, 257 pages). 
 
In this study the question is addressed whether or not the EU Water Framework 
Directive (and related directives) is a suitable legal framework for WET. The WFD 
requires identification of cost-effective programs measures, and allows for the use of 
market-based instruments, respecting the polluter pays principle. This suggests that 
WET fits well within the WFD. Other relevant directives are: IPPC-directive 
(Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control), Habitats and Birds Directive, 
Environmental Impact Analysis Directive, and Urban Wastewater Directive. 
 
None of these directives prohibit use of WET, but they can limit the scope and 
applicability. For examples, the 'Habitat-test' and the Environmental Impact Analysis 
may hamper trading of emissions, for example by prohibiting the geographical 
reallocation of emissions. The main problem however, lies with the IPPC directive 
which is oriented towards individual installations instead of water bodies, and 
requires Best Available Technology (BAT). The IPPC directive would preferably be 
changed on this point if WET is implemented, as has been done to facilitate 
emissions trading for greenhouse gases (EU-ETS). If WET is to be combined with the 
present IPPC, baseline-and-credit types of WET are more compatible with the 
installation oriented IPPC then the cap-and-trade type. 
 
In the WFD, articles 11.3g combined with article 10, 2 sections 40 and 41 indicate 
that an installation-based approach is chosen instead of a river basin approach. The 
WFD does however have a possibility to replace installation-based permits by 'other 
forms of regulation', that is possibly WET. 
 
So, even with present IPPC and WFD directives, trading is possible within the 
minimum requirements of these directives, as is illustrated in 
Figure 3.  
 
Formal lists of sector-based BAT's include relatively generalized and fixed cost 
considerations, so more cost effective and innovative measures can be applied by 
individual dischargers in order to generate tradable discharge permits that can be 
sold. 
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When focusing on point sources and more specifically wastewater treatment plants, 
the Urban Wastewater Directive opens up for WET in article 5.4, where the emphasis 
is laid on overall reductions. Because, arguably, this directive is more specific and 
'stronger' than the WFD (‘lex specialis’), this possibility can be used regardless of 
what the WFD says. In other words: legally WET is easier to establish between 
(urban) points sources than between non-point sources. 
 
An important legal principle is that the polluter should pay for his pollution. This 
principle may be respected by WETs, but grandfathering (initial allocation of free 
permits, based on historical emissions) can be seen to conflict with this principle, 
even if polluting always has been for free in the past. Auctioning the permits or 
collecting a fee could resolve this legal issue. 
 
Another legal principle is the precautionary principle. A number of techniques are 
available to make sure that the environment remains at least as healthy as before 
emissions trading was introduced. These techniques include flexible or dynamic 
emission caps, trading ratios with margins of safety, and additional or existing 
regulation. Prevention of hot spots needs to be ensured in regulation, e.g. by 
additional regulation in the individual permits, otherwise there may be a conflict with 
existing rules. 
 
An important condition for successful implementation of WET is establishing 
requirements for detailed monitoring of emissions and receiving water quality. The 
Australian Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (HRSTS) is considered an 
international prototype in this respect. In the EU this condition is generally met, 
amongst others, by the WFD. 
 
The use of pilot projects in order to test and refine any WET system is generally 
recommended in international literature, but article 11.3 of the WFD (requiring ‘basic 
measures’) may be a problem in this respect. 
 
It is recommended that WET systems be designed by a multidisciplinary team, 
consisting of at least environmental economists, legal scholars, and scientists such 
as engineers, biologists and hydrologists.  
 
The so-called paradox of geographical scales implies that for reasons of economic 
efficiency a WET system should be as large as possible, but for preventing hot spots 
a small scale system is preferable. This dilemma can be solved by using a Trading 
Ratio System (TRS, Hung and Shaw, 2005) in a river basin or catchment: one unit of 
emissions reduced in one zone, must be traded against a different number of units in 
another zone, depending on the ecological value and - damage. Zones are designed 
according to distance to discharge into the sea or lake, the function of the water 
(such as drinking water, shipping or recreation) and occurrence of protected nature 
areas. Hot spots, in general, can be prevented by capping ambient water 
concentrating levels in mixing zones (Personal communication from Sean Blacklocke, 
e-mail July 9, 2011). 
 
The River Basin Management Plans (RBMP's) of the WFD are an important basis for 
development and implementation of a WET system. The Programs of Measures 
(POM’s) are obligatory, and therefore are a good legal basis for emissions trading 
programs. Article 11 of the WFD can act as a legal basis for online trading.  
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WET requires strong monitoring and measuring protocols, verified by accredited 
auditors. Enforcement is given ample attention in this Flemish study, and does not 
seem to be a legal problem. In alternative policy instruments, enforcement is 
important too. 
 
Setting the cap (or in the case of ‘credit and baseline trading’: the baseline) for 
emissions trading should in principle take reference in the environmental quality to be 
attained. Important in this respect is the obligation mentioned in the WFD to adjust 
ambient quality norms when the desired Good Ecological Status or Good Ecological 
Potential is not attained. This means that the cap may have to be reconsidered 
periodically, or even be defined as a dynamic cap depending on certain parameters 
such as location of the emissions, water level, and season. For example, in times of 
drought, the cap could be lowered because dilution is less.3 Furthermore, use of 
trading ratios and limiting the period in which a permit can be used ('banking') can 
help preventing hot spots.  
 
Additional legal mechanisms have been used to prevent hot spots: review or 
withdrawal of individual permits, and imposition of a general obligation to ensure local 
water quality. All of these mechanisms to prevent hot spots require that all 
transactions of permits are known to the authorities. Therefore a reporting system for 
transactions is recommended, coupled to sanctions, as in the Australian HRSTS-
program. 
 
General practice in the USA in traditional permit systems that get combined with 
trading systems, is that the pollutants that are traded are taken out of individual 
permits. In traditional permits, technologies that influence the traded emissions 
remain regulated. Another approach that has been practiced is to establish a new 
common permit for a group of emitters, the Watershed General Permit, allowing the 
group to freely trade reduction measures amongst themselves. However, in Europe 
this legal construction to accommodate trading seems to be impossible at the 
moment due to the IPPC directive. Emitters that are not subject to the IPPC directive 
can more easily be incorporated in trading systems by regulations on a national level. 
 
In water quality trading in the USA, individual traditional permits may contain the rule 
that emissions should be covered by sufficient tradable permits. Traditional permits 
simply are modified by an additional paragraph regulating WET. Furthermore, 
individual permits remain important for preventing hot spots, by means of additional 
requirements such as that tradable emission permits can only be used to the extent 
that local ambient water quality remains within set norms. Finally, traditional permits 
remain important within a WET for monitoring and enforcement stipulations. 
 
A strong and well-established authority covering the whole trading area or river basin, 
such as the EPA in the USA, and for smaller national water bodies, water boards as 
in the Netherlands, has shown to be an important factor for success in establishing a 
WET system. In Europe, we still lack such cross-border authorities, but the river 
basin based WFD-structures may develop into such authorities. 
                                            
3
 Personal communication from Sean Blacklocke, e-mail July 9, 2011: The cap on allowable emissions 
is back-calculated based on the amount of pollutant that can go to the stream without exceeding Good 
Ecological Status. If the initial calculation of the cap is wrong, the cap should be reexamined, but 
variable discharge allowances based on season or stream flow may not be administratively 
manageable. In the US we generally set the caps based on worst conditions, like the seven-day, ten-
year low-flow event for rivers prone to drought with mostly point-source dischargers along it. 
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Main conclusions of the study are: 
- The option of WET needs more attention on a European level. Especially the 
IPPC directive needs to be adapted to facilitate WET.  
- Generally, the installation-based approach (aimed at individual installations and 
companies instead of general environmental targets) is a problem to any WET, 
which by nature is targeted at the overall emission level relevant to the 
environmental target. 
- The WFD with its river basin based structure is in principle well suited for enabling 
WET, and even with the present legal situation in Europe, there are possibilities 
for WET. Especially the policy in the WFD for physic-chemical substances and 
specific pollutants, and wastewater treatment plants regulated by the Urban 
Wastewater Directive, have a clear legal potential for WET.  
- Development of a pilot project is recommended, under clear legal, environmental 
economical, and enforcement conditions - conditions that are equally important to 
any other, more traditional policy instrument. 
 
3.5 The Netherlands 
A number of studies have been carried out around WET, but most reports are in 
Dutch language. There seems to be a special interest in the subject in the 
Netherlands, but perceived European legal hurdles scare national and local 
authorities, and water boards away from experimenting with WET. 
 
3.5.1 Dutch government exploration of trading for quality and quantity 
This study is in Dutch, with a short summary in English, which is sited below 
(Klooster, 2007, 84 pages). It is titled ‘Tradable water rights – exploration of a new 
instrument in integrated water management’. 
 
A general introduction to WET is given in this report, and the policy instrument has 
been compared to most relevant alternative instruments: command and control (such 
as traditional permits, and prescription of specific techniques), subsidies, levies, 
taxes and covenants (voluntary agreements). The advantages and disadvantages of 
trading depend on e.g. management goals, design and specific circumstances. In 
general, however, most important advantages of trading are cost effectiveness (costs 
savings), continuous incentive for innovation (dynamic efficiency), precise 
achievement of the emission target (provided there is adequate monitoring and 
enforcement) and flexibility for emitters.  
 
In the USA it is federal policy to support the development of trading projects, and the 
in last decades many projects have been initiated. Expected cost savings vary from 
40 to 80% compared to strict command and control type policies. Yet, it is too early to 
conclude that water quality trading is a definite success in the USA, in many cases 
because the total maximum daily loads (the emissions caps) have not yet been 
established, or are still relatively large/high. However, the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) is actively promoting trading, including financial support. 
The large amount of available reports and other literature from the USA should be 
useful for the study and implementation of water quality trading in Europe. 
 
The design of a well-functioning trading system requires special attention for the 
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following issues: 
- In most cases, initial distribution of permits is the most controversial part. Although 
auctioning theoretically in many ways is the best option, the permits are usually 
distributed for free, mainly in order to get stakeholder support for implementing a 
new system. Also, todays water users often have historic rights to use the water. 
- Compared to air pollution, the location of the discharge is important for water 
pollution. Therefore, special care should be taken to prevent problematic 
concentrations of discharges: hot spots. Several ways to prevent hot spots in a 
water quality trading system are described. 
- To assure that transfer of permits from seller to buyer does not result in a net 
increase in environmental damage, correction factors or trading ratios are often 
used. Correction factors are intended to compensate for differences in 
environmental damage caused by discharges on different locations, for example 
due to ecological or other location specific circumstances. 
- Transactions should be hindered as little as possible by so-called transactions 
costs, such as government duties to be paid, bureaucracy, regulation and 
(perceived) risks.  
- To create sufficient support, all stakeholders should be involved in an early stage 
during the development of a trading system. 
Unlike e.g. the global trading system for greenhouse gasses, specific local 
circumstances can and should be taken into consideration while developing the 
usually small-scale water quality trading systems. Compared to national or European 
regulation, this may increase support from local stakeholders.  
 
The study explains with a figure how WET could contribute to cheaper additional 
measures, while respecting existing regulation:  
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. How WET fits into and supplements existing regulation (such as IPPC -, Nitrates - and Urban 
Wastewater directives). Existing regulation is not sufficient to reach set ambient ecological targets. WET 
ensures that overall total reductions end up under the cap. Sources that can only reduce at high costs 
(such as C and D) do so only to level 2, while buying credits from sources that can reduce cheaply to 
lower than required levels (A, B and E). Overall result is that the cap is reached precisely and at lowest 
possible costs.  
 
It is noted in the report that, in order to get support from sectors unable to pay for 
their cheap reductions (possibly agriculture), it is possible to allocate them relatively 
many permits, which they can than sell for financing their abatement efforts. This 
strategy is not compliant with the polluter pays principle at a sector level, but it is at 
an individual emitter’s level. 
 
Conclusion of this exploratory study is that, taking into account the huge challenges 
water policymakers face and the increasingly high associated costs, this promising 
policy instrument deserves more thorough study and attention in Europe. Further 
research should focus on: 
- transfer of American knowledge and experience, 
- different types of water rights trading (cap and trade, credit trading and hybrid 
systems), 
- ways to include non-point sources such as agriculture, 
- the legal and policy context of introducing water rights trading in the Netherlands 
and Europe, 
- quantifying differences in the cost-effectiveness and potential cost savings, 
- public support and cultural issues. 
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3.5.2 Master-thesis: WET in Dutch Water Management 
Full title of this thesis is: Emissions trading in Dutch water quality management – 
Feasibility study into emissions trading as a new policy instrument (Kamphuis, 2008). 
In this MSc thesis at the Delft University of Technology (68 pages in Dutch, 1 page 
English abstract), the author concludes that water emissions trading is feasible in 
theory, but he points at the present BAT requirements in IPPC and WFD. In two case 
studies he concludes: 
 
Nutrient trading in the Zuidpolder in Delfland, the Netherlands, is not suitable 
because the greenhouses that are main polluters will shortly be connected to 
wastewater treatment plants. The remaining emitters, farms and wastewater 
treatment plants themselves, could potentially trade profitably, but uncertainty about 
effects of measures (in particular riparian buffer zones) and problematic monitoring 
and accountability of emissions, will probably make WET difficult. 
 
The other case study is on trading cooling water discharges on the river Rhine. 
During hot and dry summers, water temperatures of the Rhine are above norm with 
increasing frequency. Emissions trading in the German part of the river is a good and 
profitable policy instrument for controlling discharges of cooling water. In the German 
part there are enough emitters and thus potential for trading is good. Emissions 
trading could save €3.75 million (not clear from the study, but probably per year). In 
the Dutch part of the river however, there are too few emitters and a too low a volume 
of cooling water to make WET worthwhile. The thesis does not consider joining the 
Dutch and German market, which seems a natural step because it concerns the 
same water body. 
 
3.5.3 Legal implications of economic instruments in water policy 
This is a legally oriented Master’s thesis by Anita Jolink at the Centre for 
Environmental Law and Policy, Utrecht University (2010, in English, 104 pages). Main 
conclusion is that the instrument of tradable water pollution rights (WET) is legally 
possible, but limited by current European laws. More specifically, emission limits may 
not be exceeded when for example one polluter buys emission rights from a polluter 
that reduces more than he is obliged. However, wherever additional reductions of 
emissions are needed to attain water quality targets (such as the good ecological 
status mentioned in the WFD), there should be room, both legally and economically, 
for mutually beneficial trading (refer to figure 3). 
 
Regarding eutrophication, the Nitrates Directive states that the maximum amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer that can be applied per hectare is 170 kg. The Netherlands have 
been allowed to use up to 250 kg per hectare due to a derogation granted by the EC. 
A trade system could for example be designed with a cap of 170 kg/ha, while 
allowing farmers to buy emission rights (or ‘fertilizer rights’) up to 250 kg/ha. Jolink 
assumes that farmers would not favour this design because they would have to take 
extra reduction measures, but at the same time she writes (p.84) that this system 
could be in line with the 'Van der Vlies'-motion passed by Dutch parliament stating 
that the financial burden of extra environmental measures on farmers should not be 
allowed to increase. In fact, farmers could earn extra money with the system when 
they take cheap reduction measures and sell the allowances to other farmers or other 
sectors such as wastewater treatment plants. Also Jolink thinks that introducing these 
caps might endanger the derogation the Dutch have presently, because the system 
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might show to the EC that the 170 kg/ha limit is achievable after all. 
 
Jolink concludes that a new monitoring authority would have to be established to 
administer and monitor trading, and that the costs associated with this should be 
balanced against societal benefits of the system. 
 
Jolink states that a WET system would be more interesting for countries that have not 
yet reached their goals, while the Dutch already have attained their goals. However, it 
may be true that Dutch agriculture have attained their fertilizer application targets (in 
kg/hectare), but the overall ambient water quality targets (concentration targets as 
defined in the WBMP's) have generally not yet been met, so additional measures are 
necessary. It would be most cost-effective and thus compliant with the WFD, to let 
market forces choose these additional measures within a WET-framework, and 
thereby stimulate the necessary innovation. 
 
Jolink writes that a WET system in the Netherlands could be introduced alongside 
existing legislation, similar to the CO2 emission trading scheme (ETS), and similar to 
the way water quality trading is being implemented in the USA. The idea is to change 
as little as possible to existing legislation and permits. The only thing that changes is 
that the emission limits mentioned in the permits are made flexible and dependent 
upon the number of allowances a polluter has. 
 
Introducing WET in this way does not seem to be contrary to existing Dutch water 
legislation. However, there is a ruling from the European Court of Justice, case C-
322/00 regarding the Nitrates Directive, that states that emission limits have to be 
respected at any time. Therefore, the Dutch MINAS system that calculated the net 
loss of nutrients instead of the directive's plain input restriction of 170 kg/ha, was not 
allowed and discarded. This limits trading opportunity within a WET for nitrates. For 
other pollutants the same problem exists regarding the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive: a polluter cannot buy unlimited discharge 
rights. However, he can indeed sell rights when he reduces his emissions beyond 
what is required, to buyers that are not reducing their emissions sufficiently. Refer to  
Figure 3, page 25. 
 
3.5.4 Dutch government: how to allocate emissions permits? 
This study (by KPMG Sustainability, 2008, in Dutch, 112 pages) is sceptical about a 
large scale trading system like the EU ETS for water, but optimistic about a fund 
similar to the Swedish model: fees charged per kg of nutrient emitted fill the fund, 
which in turn pays for reduction measures (p. 92). However, the legal obligation to 
use Best Available Techniques (BATs) is limiting room for trading (see  
Figure 3, page 25.). Therefore it is recommended that this problem is dealt with at a 
European level. 
 
For thermic discharges on a local scale, the study is recommending an offsetting 
system, legally founded in a covenant (private agreement), and that the government 
starts a pilot on cooling water discharges in the municipality of Moerdijk, The 
Netherlands (p. 102). However, this pilot has not been started yet. 
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3.5.5 Free University reports by Oosterhuis 
This section discusses two short reports by Frans Oosterhuis, titled 'Opportunities for 
the use of tradable permits in Dutch water quality policy' (2006, in English, 16 pages), 
and ‘Experience with tradable permits in water quality management in the USA’ 
(2006, in Dutch, 15 pages). The instrument of WET is discussed for the Dutch 
situation, and the experience with water quality trading in the USA is summarized. 
  
Main conclusion is that: taking into account presents EU directives, WET seems 
especially suitable to fill the gap between what can be achieved with source related 
requirements by the WFD, and the eventual ambient water quality that is also 
required by the WFD and other legislation (see  
Figure 3, page 25). 
 
In other words, and as is concluded in many other publications discussed here, 
specific pollution control measure requirements, such as BAT and emission or input 
limits (such as the 250 kg/ha rule by the Nitrate Directive), often are insufficient to 
reach ambient water quality targets of Good Ecological Status or Potential.  
 
The current prescriptive measure requirements limit the likelihood of a discharger 
buying a lot of emission rights, which will limit the applicability of a WET system. But 
on the other hand, WET as a supplemental policy instrument to BAT and other 
prescriptive measures, does still enable the achievement of cleaner waters where 
these measures are inadequate. And in less time and at a lower cost, while 
respecting cost-effectiveness and flexibility for the participating actors. In the future 
though, if the EC were to actively promote and facilitate Water Emissions Trading by 
modifying directives such as the WFD, Nitrates Directive and the IPPC, scope for 
WET and its advantages could be broadened, thereby increasing opportunities for 
cleaner waters faster and cheaper. 
 
Oosterhuis emphasizes that emissions trading not only provides static efficiency by 
allowing flexibility for those measures to be taken with best cost-effectiveness. 
Emissions trading also provides dynamic efficiency: it stimulates development and 
spreading of innovative and even more cost-effective reduction measures and 
techniques. 
 
Furthermore, a number of general recommendations and design issues are 
discussed in this paper, describing and introducing the instrument of WET in a 
condensed way. 
 
In the second paper by Frans Oosterhuis, together with Rob van der Veeren (in 
Dutch, 2006), an overview and evaluation is given of experience with water quality 
trading (WET) in the USA. It is concluded that there is ample experience in the USA, 
and that there are a lot of different forms of trading being practiced.  
 
In practice, the number of transactions in many trading programs have often been 
low. There is a number of reasons for this: 
- A WET system can only cover a limited area because WET is more prone to hot 
spots than air pollution trading systems. This results in a lower number of 
potential traders, and thus fewer potential transactions. 
- Also because of the danger of hot spots, additional limitations to trades are 
necessary, such as trading ratios and individual official approval of every trade. 
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This as opposed to the greenhouse gas trading systems, where it is irrelevant 
wherever in the world emissions take place, and trading can be free and with very 
low transaction costs. 
- Sources often discover cheap reduction measures within their own facilities after 
the trading system is in place. When they start investigating compliance 
strategies, trading may appear to be unnecessary.  
 
Oosterhuis also points out the differences between the USA and Europe. In the USA 
emissions from agriculture have had little regulation until now, whereas in Europe 
there are for examples the Nitrates Directive and regulation related to the Common 
Agricultural Policy. This means that in the EU, emissions trading is legally more 
complicated than in the USA, and also that a number of the most cost-effective 
measures (‘low hanging fruit’) already are compulsory. 
 
3.5.6 WET for drinking water companies 
This short report by KIWA Water Research (2006, 31 pages) rejects WET as an 
instrument suitable for obtaining WFD targets for the drinking water sector, though it 
recognizes that not all questions have been answered yet.  
 
An interesting suggestion that can be derived from this study (see page 9) is using 
the so-called environmental measurement system (in Dutch: www.milieumeetlat.nl) 
as a basis for trading. This measurement system quantifies environmental impact 
from various crop protection chemicals in uniform environmental impact units. If for 
examples a water board sets a target for a maximum number of environmental 
impact units for a certain area, and distributes these units amongst users, a cap and 
trade system would virtually be in place. This idea deserves further exploration. 
 
3.6 German Ph. D. thesis  
The Ph. D. thesis Water Quality Trading Systems: An Integrated Economic Analysis 
of Theoretical and Practical Approaches, by Marianne Keudel at the University of 
Cologne (2007, in English, 206 pages), is an assessment of the theoretical 
background of water quality trading systems, including design options and practical 
approaches. The thesis recommends a thorough analysis of river specific ecological 
and economic criteria and dimensions before designing a WET. One practical 
approach followed in a WET in Australia is especially interesting, according to this 
study. The criteria developed in this study can also be used to analyse ill designed or 
ill functioning WET systems, in order to improve them. Opportunities for successful 
and beneficial WET systems are expected to be greatest in countries with a stable 
institutional framework and limited existing prescriptive regulations for water quality. 
 
3.7 United Kingdom 
In a report from the UK Forestry Commission (Coull, 2008) WET is discussed. WET 
is seen as a form of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES). Some key citations: 
 
“Water quality trading has developed in the US, representing an innovative approach 
to meeting requirements under the Clean Water Act. This approach has been largely 
overlooked in Europe so far.” 
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“4: Water Quality Trading 
Summary 
- The Clean Water Act in the USA and the Water Framework Directive in the UK are 
instrumental pieces of legislation in water quality. Both allow for the use of trading 
as a tool to meeting regulatory goals. 
- Whilst the UK has so far opted for more traditional instruments such as rules and 
licensing, the USA has several water trading schemes which are used to meet 
regulations.” 
 
“…Water Quality trading has not been considered to be a viable option, due to the 
perceived administrative costs. 
... Water quality trading offers several advantages to policymakers. Where it is 
appropriately utilized, it can offer economic benefits in reduced administration costs. 
Arguably it may achieve environmental standards quickly and encourage innovation 
in meeting these.” 
 
“Tackling non-point pollution (i.e. pollution from agricultural and urban runoff) is more 
difficult, but there are examples of trading systems where these sources have been 
included.” 
 
“Overall, water quality trading is considered favourably as a tool in the USA, and the 
use of forestry, through measures such as riparian planting, is seen to be part of this 
solution.” 
 
“The scope of water quality trading should be explored further as a means to meeting 
requirements under the Water Framework Directive.” 
 
3.8 Poland 
Already in 2007 Poland explored WET, as reported in ‘The Concept of a Trading 
System of Mandatory Reductions of Pollutants Discharged to Surface Waters’ 
(Ostojski and Wilk, 2007, 19 pages, in English), by the Polish Institute of Meteorology 
and Water Management. 
In this report the concept of WET is introduced, in relation to the obligations Poland 
has resulting from the WFD and other water related EU-directives. The authors of the 
report expect that WET-systems can generate financial revenues for authorities to 
pay for the implementation of the WFD. These revenues are expected to come from 
auctioning the permits, and from taxes on trades. 
Recently there is new interest in the topic, according to Wilk Pawel of the Polish 
Institute of Meteorology and Water Management (personal communication, e-mail 
November, 16, 2011). His dissertation research on nutrient absorption capacity is 
also intended as a basis for WET. 
3.9 Italy 
In Italy an exploration of WET similar to explorations in other EU countries has been 
done by Simone Borghesi in an article in Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali 
(2008, 22 pages, in Italian). In the English abstract she concludes: “Despite the 
potential benefits of tradable permits and the success reported in some contexts, 
from the present case study analysis it turns out that several factors, including lack of 
sufficient market competition, may sometimes hinder their functioning in practice.” 
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Furthermore, part of the PhD. thesis of Greti Lucaroni of 2011 is about WET. She 
applied WET to Trasimeno Lake, a lake of central Italy, where she simulated an 
auction for the initial allocation of permits. 
 
4 Opportunities in Europe 
In this chapter we discuss some possible areas where application of the instrument 
of WET seems promising. 
4.1 WFD 
As De Smedt (2007) and others points out, WET fits well within the WFD, for a 
number of reasons: 
1. It respects the Polluter Pays Principle, and demands cost recovery 
2. The WFD calls for the achievement of good ecological status, and departs from 
there, just as the cap and trade principle starts from fixed ecologically sustainable 
boundaries, and requires the market (economy) to sort out the rest. This as 
opposed to discharge levies, that start from a fixed levy, and leaves it to the 
environment to sort out the rest (in other words: the environmental outcome is 
uncertain). 
3. The WFD takes care of the monitoring and enforcement, necessary for trading. 
4. The WFD is organized based upon natural units for water management: 
watersheds, river basins and water bodies, which also are logical trading zones 
for WET-programs. 
 
The EC could facilitate use of this instrument to the member states by providing the 
legal framework and practical guidance for implementing different sorts of trading 
possibilities. Financial support is also needed, just as the US Environmental 
Protection Agency has done with its 2003 Water Quality Trading Policy (US EPA, 
2003). Wherever directives would need to be changed, the EU could provide 
exemptions from these directives for making pilot projects possible, and in due time 
with knowledge gained from these pilots, actually amend the directives. 
 
Areas where WET would be interesting in the WFD are primarily eutrophication 
(nitrogen and phosphorus), but also cooling water discharges, and the priority 
substances. Introducing market forces connected to WET could speed up the 
achievement of the ecological targets by stimulating innovative techniques, and save 
money by improving cost efficiency. 
 
4.2 North Sea 
The North Sea has several environmental problems. Eutrophication is one of them, 
that could be handled with a WET system, similar to the plan developed for the Baltic 
Sea (Green Stream Network, 2008). The North Sea has some similarities to the Baltic 
Sea: 
- Eutrophication is a problem 
- It is a relatively sheltered sea with limited run through of clean water 
- Likely there are differences in marginal pollutant control costs between emitters 
because a large number of actors can participate. 
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Photo 1. Foam on North Sea beach, caused by algae resulting from eutrophication (photo by R. 
Torenbeek, 2011) 
 
Also, this would be a good time to consider WET for the North Sea because the 
Marine Strategy Directive (MSD) is now being implemented. 
 
In this context the question arises how a WET for nutrient discharges into the North 
Sea would interact with the WFD measures already taken in the countries around the 
North Sea. A possible answer is that the WFD measures would not be affected by a 
North Sea WET, but the North Sea WET could lead to additional measures. Present 
measures would simply remain necessary to comply with the WFD, but in order to 
guarantee achievement of MSD emission targets for the North Sea, additional 
measures could be necessary. Instead of taking these additional measures, a country 
could buy extra emission rights from other countries if that would be more attractive 
or cheaper. In this way, each environmental problem, for each area, would have its 
own cap, in compliance with the so-called ‘Tinbergen rule’.  
 
The Tinbergen Rule states that for each and every policy target there must be at 
least one policy tool. If there are fewer tools than targets, then some policy goals will 
not be achieved. 
 
Another environmental problem, or at least a scarcity problem, is overfishing in 
certain areas and on certain species of fish. This problem too can be dealt with by 
using tradable permits, but that is beyond the scope of this study. A useful reference 
for this topic is Anderson (1999). 
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4.3 Cooling water discharges 
There is less experience with tradable emission rights for cooling water then there is 
with eutrophication, but several projects and studies (Kamphuis, 2008 and KPMG 
Sustainability, 2008) conclude that it is indeed an interesting environmental problem 
to tackle with WET. 
 
In an advanced version, emission rights could be defined as a percentage of the total 
discharge space. This space would then be defined and vary depending upon several 
ecological factors, such as water temperature, water quantity (relevant because of 
dilution) and season. A model calculating maximum space for discharging heat would 
be necessary. Ideally, an Internet-based trading platform would show allowable 
discharge space on a daily basis. Discharges of participating sources could also be 
monitored permanently by automated on-line measuring of temperature and water 
quantity. 
 
There are a number of rivers and watersheds in Europe where high temperatures are 
an ecological problem, for examples the Rhine, Elbe, Danube and the Rhone. 
 
4.4 Other water related problems 
There are a number of other environmental problems related to water where tradable 
permits could be considered. In principle, if there is a measurable norm or cap to any 
discharge and identifiable sources, trading is an option.  
 
In the USA trading has been mainly applied to eutrophication, but also to micro-
polluters such as heavy metals (Cu, Zn, Pb and Sn), salination (salts), cooling water 
(temperature) and organic matter (Dissolvable Organic Carbon, DOC). According to 
Blacklocke (Personal communication, e-mail July 9, 2011) also total suspended 
sediments and faecal coliform have been considered for trading. 
 
Furthermore, one could think of trading applied to the relatively new source of water 
pollution by medical drugs, such as hormones and antibiotics (penicillin). Allowances 
could be assigned to for example hospitals, medicine companies and/or drug stores. 
This could speed up implementation of innovative measures such as Pharmafilter 
(www.pharmafilter.nl). 
 
The use of pesticides could be controlled with a WET, using the interchangeability 
system for different chemicals mentioned in the Dutch Environmental Measurement 
instrument (‘Milieumeetlat’, in Dutch, www.milieumeetlat.nl). There may be other 
systems already developed to quantify different sorts of (water) pollution in one unit, 
that might qualify for trading. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
 
There is agreement in discussed studies that the EC directives IPPC and Nitrates are 
limiting WET in Europe. Countries interested in WET, such as the Netherlands, 
Finland and Sweden, could work jointly and lobby towards accommodation of WET 
by the EC. 
 
However, even in today’s legal environment WET is possible and offer opportunities. 
Many of the studies on European water quality trading conclude that existing EC 
directives limit room for trading, but mainly in the sense that polluters cannot emit 
more than existing regulation allows. But WET can be useful in reducing emissions 
utterly, beyond those minimum levels dictated by technology standards such as BAT, 
and in a cost-effective and flexible way. This is necessary in order to reach the 
targets for healthy water ecosystems as required by the WFD.  
 
In other words, existing directives and regulations provide a minimum of measures 
that all emitters have to take, but for reaching still outstanding environmental targets, 
WET can help to identify existing and develop innovative cost-effective measures that 
bring us the necessary additional improvements. Actually, existing regulation may be 
helpful for implementing WET, because it helps prevent hot spots, which are one of 
the main risks of WET. 
 
Definitions seem to cause confusion. Some people associate the word emissions 
trading with large-scale systems like EU ETS for greenhouse gasses and the SO2-
trading in the USA. Others use emissions trading also down to small-scale projects 
where two sources make a single trade. The former group of people rather refers to 
these small-scale projects as offsetting systems or funds. In this study we use WET 
for both small and larger scale trading systems. 
 
The Swedish model is an interesting solution to the problem of measuring and 
accounting for emissions from non-point sources, often used as a reason to reject 
WET. Cap and trade is the theoretically optimal system of trading, but in practice it is 
only possible for point source trading. Credit-trading (with a relative cap) is the 
easiest trading system for non-points sources such as agriculture. The Swedish 
system has found a way to combine these two into a coherent and optimal system. 
The system deserves to be studied and experimented with. 
 
An interesting suggestion that can be derived from the KIWA study (p.9) (see chapter 
3.4.6) is using the so-called environmental measurement system 
(www.milieumeetlat.nl) as a basis for trading. This measurement system quantifies 
environmental impact from various crop protection chemicals in one uniform unit. If 
for examples a water board sets a target for a maximum number of environmental 
impact units for a certain area, and distributes these units as permits amongst users, 
a cap and trade system would virtually be in place. This idea deserves further 
exploration. 
 
Any sector or group of emitters unable to pay for their cheap and needed reductions 
can be allocated relatively many permits. This does not respect the polluter pays 
principle on a group level, but it does so on an individual level. 
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Specific recommendations to: 
 
The EC: 
- Provide facilitation with financial support and guidance, similar to EPA’s water 
trading policy of 2003 (US EPA, 2003); 
- Use legal room already available for pilots; 
- Study opportunities for WET applied to new environmental problems and areas; 
- Commission research into WET in Europe. 
 
National member state governments: 
- Lobby the EC for WET-facilitation; 
- Use legal room already available: phases 1 and 2 of the Baltic Sea trading plan 
can be implemented today in any European country or water body: reverse 
auction4 and an investment fund financed by point source dischargers, both 
voluntary; 
- Study opportunities for WET applied to new environmental problems and in 
specific catchment areas (river basins); 
- Explore using existing institutions for implementing WET, for example the Dutch 
emission trading authority (‘Nederlandse Emissiehandelsautoriteit’, NEa) or 
similar in other countries, or other suitable water authorities, such as water 
boards. 
 
Other authorities such as water boards and municipalities: 
- Use legal room already available for pilots and experiments; 
- Propose detailed plans to the EC and ask for support and facilitation. 
 
 
                                            
4
 Actors are invited to offer reduction measures, and the authorities choose measures with best cost-
effectiveness. 
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Abbreviations 
BSAP  Baltic Sea Action Plan 
EU-ETS European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
WET  Water Emissions Trading 
WFD  Water Framework Directive 
WRI  World Resources Institute 
EPA  Environmental Protection Agency 
BAT  Best Available Techniques 
IPPC  Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
HRSTS Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (in Australia) 
TRS  Trading Ratio System 
RBMP River Basin Management Plan (for the WFD) 
POM  Programme Of Measures 
MSD  Marine Strategy Directive 
WERF Water Environment Federation 
LBS (Pound) Libra Pound or English pound = around 0.45 kilogram. 
